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In direct contravention of my wife's explicit instructions, herewith I inaugurate my first blog. Long may it prosper.
For some reason, I think I have something to say to you. You think you have something to say to me? Email me at: gideonsblogger -at- yahoo -dot- com
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Tuesday, February 26, 2002
Book review time. I just finished reading George Orwell's The Lion and the Unicorn. It's marvelous. I had forgotten how much I love him - his writing, his thinking, his ability not only to think but to feel intelligently. I've been working my way slowly through My Country Right or Left, the second volume of his collected essays, letters and miscellaneous writings, covering the years 1940-1943. If you followed Andy Sullivan's website post 9/11, you know how apropos his read of the English intellectual class was of our own intellectual class in our day: the same mindless defeatism and self-hatred. The context is very different of course; while Europe may be sinking under low birth rates, sclerotic growth and unassimilated immigrants, America is in no such position, and our current enemies have no power to defeat us, only to destroy. But what resonates is the professional thinker's unparalleled inability - then as now - to think. But that's not what's most interesting about The Lion and the Unicorn. The essay is presented as a meditation on the English character, how that character is being revealed under the stress of war, and what revolutionary changes in the social and economic system in Britain would be necessary to preserve the independence upon which national character depends. It is, to begin with, refreshing to read anything so forthright on the now-taboo subject of national character. But what strikes me most about the essay is how important class is to his understanding of the English character, and yet how all his prescriptions for the revolutionizing of English life are premised on the need to uproot the pervasive influence of class in English society. So much of what Orwell praises about the English character - the decency, the belief in the procedures of justice, the hatred of war - these things are bound up, it seems to me, with the English Constitution, which is to say, with the feudal inheritance, which is to say, with the English institutionalization of class. France is a wheel, with spokes radiating from the center, and has been for a good 500 years if not more. Such a society can be mobilized by the center or can resist it, but it is always defined by it. England is a pyramid; the important directions are not in and out but up and down. And such societies resist mobilization. The chaotic capitalism that Orwell inveighs against is natural to such a society, as dirigisme is not. Much of Orwell's revolution was carried out in the post-war years, and it has done nothing good for the English character. Indeed, the English character is in such disrepute with the English at this point in their history that the one thing that all political stripes agree upon is that England should be less English. (The Thatcherites want it to be more like America; the Blairites more like Europe; and the Guardian more like South Africa.) Orwell had a profound experience of socialism on the barricades in Spain. Indeed, in Homage to Catalonia (one of my all-time favorite books) Orwell comes to some kind of a recognition that Socialism - or that which he loves about Socialism - is really a feeling or experience, the experience of life on the barricades. It is the experience of solidarity, and (this is something Orwell doesn't really recognize in his pro-revolutionary writings) it cannot be the experience of ordinary life. Any attempt to institutionalize that kind of solidarity leads to the kinds of disaster we saw frequently in the century past, disasters that Orwell understood too well. Nonetheless, it is clear that the English experience of class profoundly obstructed that sense of solidarity, and Orwell understood correctly that such a sense of solidarity - which had emerged strongly in wartime - had to be strengthened and extended if the war was to be won. And so he called for the abolition, effectively, of the English class system. Dispensing with the ignorant economics, Orwell's social critique of liberalism is still relevant, and not only (or particularly) to England. Many of us who live with the liberty of the moderns find the liberal air somewhat thin. Orwell turned to Socialism as a cure. Arendt turned to the liberty of the ancients, and tried (particularly in On Revolution) to reconstitute America's political tradition (not very successfully) on classical republican foundations. Others have turned, and continue to turn, to religious communities to fill the social void of liberalism. It is a topic we continue to live with, and one to which I will return. (Indeed, the next book I'll tackle - Michael Oakeshott's The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Skepticism - may be of help here.) One other point on Orwell. It has struck me before that the great tragedy of recent English history is that England could not turn her Empire into something that might last. It is not obvious to me that the post-colonial road was necessarily the best one for the peoples from Ireland to India who were subject to English rule. Had England suffered these diverse peoples to govern themselves, in alliance with rather than in subjection to England, I see no necessary reason why England would not still be a world power. Orwell outlines something like this in his essay. And I suspect that the reason that the English never could accept such a vision was that, well, they didn't like foreigners, another trait attested to by Orwell. They would consent to rule them, but, with exceptions, of course, not to be their fellows. The irony, of course, is that England has, like every European country, imported large numbers of the very peoples whom they would not live with as equals in a family of nations, and now they must nonetheless live with them as equals on their own streets. Forgive me for posting anything nice about Michael Lewis, but this recent column is right on the money. I would add to his arguments another big one: the moral hazard of knowing that the government will protect shareholders will result in wider spreads in the credit markets, which will do more damage than the drop in the equity markets has. I worry about the direction the Enron story has taken. On the one side, more and more arguments are being made that Enron proves the need for greater regulations. But the kinds of regulations being proposed would, in most cases, do nothing to prevent another Enron. Some would do real damage to the capital markets. And none address the real fallout from Enron: a crisis of confidence that has dramatically raised the risk-premium. There's an effect I've heard discussed, I don't know what it's called, that suggests that personal risk-taking has an equilibrium, and that when one aspect of risk is reduced, if social risk preferences are unchanged, other behavior will become more risky to compensate (and vice versa, if one aspect of risk increases). Thus, more effective contraception means more sexual partners, safer automobiles means more - and more aggressive - driving, etc. (I wonder sometimes whether the 1990s penchant for extreme sports didn't have something to do with the fact that society wasn't generating enough risk for its physical risk-seekers - for example, fighting wars or colonizing Mars.) In any event, the point is that effective risk-reduction enables a society to take more risk. In the economy, the ability to take more risk means the ability to achieve more reward. Effective regulation is where the regulation's costs are substantially less than the benefit of the additional risky activity made possible by the reduction of risk. The classic example is the government role in enforcing transparency in the market. If market participants have the confidence that we are all getting good information in a timely manner, they will provide capital to businesses more cheaply. They will lend money in greater amounts at lower rates, and they will bid stock prices up. And this is good for everyone, so long as the confidence is well-placed. Where it isn't, and this is exposed, you can have a crisis in confidence. And this is precisely what is happening now in the market. I happen to be the proud and angry owner of a number of shares of Tyco International stock. That company is currently essentially shut out of the market for commercial paper because the market is concerned about their accounting. They are not concerned because they see smoke and assume there is fire; the concern is that they are not convinced that, post-Enron, they will be able to see the smoke if there is smoke. There is a crisis of confidence in the accounting profession. One consequence is that a good company that plays by the rules and has added significant value to the world may be destroyed. (I'm still a shareholder - added to my position recently, in fact - so I obviously think they won't be destroyed but will come through fine. But I'm playing the odds. Once you have a liquidity crisis, bad things can happen for no good reason. As Keynes, I believe, said: the market can remain irrational for longer than you can remain solvent.) It is very difficult to prevent self-dealing and corruption of the sort that was clearly practiced at Arthur Anderson. Indeed, there's a cultural component to this: if the culture has internalized the notion that corruption is normal, then it will be normal, and hard to root out; where the culture has internalized an ethic of honest dealing, corruption will be more infrequent, and easier to root out. I am certainly not convinced that a corrupt ethic is a necessary consequence of capitalism; indeed, it is often cited as one of the biggest impediments to the advance of capitalism in the Third World that many of these countries lack an ethic of honest dealing. (Theodore Dalrymple made the interesting case several months ago in City Journal for the proposition that corruption is in fact the logical cultural response to rampant statism - that entrepreneurship and individualism can survive in over-regulated environments only through corruption. This, he argues, is the reason why Italy has economically outperformed Britain in the post-war years. Britain after the war enacted one degree or another of Socialism, and, because the British have a cultural ethic of honest dealing and aversion to corruption that go naturally with their long tradition of liberty, the economy groaned under over-regulation. The Italians, meanwhile, having little experience with free government, are used to the idea that one must break the rules, and so have survived better under over-regulation - by ignoring the regulations. An interesting argument, I think.) Returning to the specific issue of accounting: several times during the 1990s, legislation or administrative regulations were proposed to rein in various kinds of accounting abuses - including proposals to prevent audit firms from selling consulting services. These were always shot down by bi-partisan coalitions of pro-business politicians. In the 1990s, it seemed that the interests of business and the interests of capitalism were one and the same, and pretty much everyone wanted to be on a bandwagon that was making us all rich. But it isn't true that they are always the same, and there is a real danger now that the backlash will do real damage to capitalism. One of the more depressing aspects of the Enron fiasco is the way it has given strength to (what I consider) the wrong side of two arguments: campaign finance reform (about which I am ambivalent, and which has no obvious relevance to Enron), and social security reform (stocks have risk! better not help people who don't already own them get their hands on them). Even worse, it has propelled a new crusade, by Senators Boxer and Corzine (two of my least favorite among that century of worthies), to regulate 401(k) plans. This Wall Street Journal editorial does a reasonable job of outlining the case against regulation, if in their usual obnoxious tone. In fact, Enron should be undertstood as a story about the corruption of those responsible for regulation and oversight. Enron's board did not exercise its function to properly oversee management; we are long overdue for regulations mandating greater independence for boards of directors. Enron's auditors did not exercise their function to properly police Enron's accounting; we are long overdue for regulations to limit conflicts of interest in audit firms such as arise when these firms are also consultants to audit clients. Enron's analysts on Wall Street did not exercise their function to properly evaluate the company's health and prospects - there were all kinds of warning signs - poor return on capital, dropping margins, confusing accounting, and yet ever-escalating earnings - yet no major Wall Street house showed skepticism because skepticism didn't sell. We are long overdue for regulations separating research from investment banking. And, lastly, the Federal Government did not perform its function of protecting the citizenry from fraud by repeatedly making regulatory decisions not on the basis of what improved transparency and the functioning of markets but on the basis of what best served the immediate interests of the business class. And we are long overdue for a political party beholden neither to corporate nor bureaucratic interests but to the interests of the citizenry. An argument for the kind of regulation that increases transparency at a reasonable cost should be familiar to Republicans. Such arguments are a staple of the editorial pages at the Wall Street Journal and Barrons, and have been made by star GOP legislators like Phil Gramm in the past. But the party as a whole does not do a good job of making such arguments, whether out of fear or feebleness I don't know. And some legislators - such as Billy Tauzin - have been poster-boys for mis-governance. More stuff on the Saudi peace proposal, from JPost and Ha'aretz. My take in brief: the proposal is real and meaningful AND is primarily a PR exercise. Let me explain. The Saudi ruling family is genuinely worried that, once the axis of evil is dealt with, the U.S. will turn on them next. This is not at all implausible. The Saudis have not been particularly helpful post-9/11, and their religious ideology is one major cause of 9/11 in the first place. They need to do something to get back in the Americans' good graces. What better than to try to cut the Gordian knot of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Abdullah has simultaneously raised Saudi Arabia's profile (as the ones who can deliver the "Muslim street" on a deal with Israel) and indicated that his regime will be part of the solution, not part of the problem. So the motivation is PR. But the substance is real, for 3 reasons. First, this is the first suggestion by Saudi Arabia that it would be willing to recognize Israel. Since that government is charged with guarding the holiest places of Islam, and considers itself more generally the center of the Muslim world, and since Islamic rejection of the notion of a Jewish state is the most intractable aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this is an important development. Second, while it is clear that the '67 borders are to be a point of reference, it does appear that Abdullah is willing to contemplate adjustments to those borders that are compensated. This is essential for Israel because the '67 borders are both unacceptably insecure and would involve giving up central parts of the Jewish patrimony, such as the Western Wall. Third, it changes the dynamic of the diplomatic process that has always proceeded alongside the war process. Netanyahu and Barak agreed that it was not in Israel's interest to keep making interim agreements with Arafat and getting nothing in exchange; that's why Barak, who genuinely wanted an agreement, took the risk of pushing for final status talks. Even at this late date, I think they were right; the Oslo process was a salami process, and the time had come for Arafat to make peace or declare his true intentions. We all know what he did. Arafat's recourse to war has always had one primary purpose: to achieve concessions by violence without surrendering anything at the negotiating table. But so long as Israel is unwilling or unable to destroy the PA, and so long as the PA can hold out, this is a losing dynamic for Israel, because the diplomatic pressure to do something to end the violence will ultimately force them to agree to a cease-fire that gives Arafat something in exchange for simply ending the violence - in other words, that rewards him for terror. Check out this editorial in JPost if you want to see what the situation is doing to Sharon's position with his own supporters. By pushing once again for a complete solution to the conflict, the Saudi Crown Prince has changed the dynamic back to one that ultimately favors Israel (presuming, of course, that Israel wants an agreement and a two-state solution). The main thing that the proposal does not begin to sketch out is: what will preserve Israeli security after a deal? Any answer to that question must deal with the fact that Arafat now presides over a terrorist state. The existence of a state of that character is incompatible with Israeli security, and no possible agreement for, say, sharing Jerusalem can be worked out absent a resolution of the nature of the regime that governs the Palestinians. I continue to believe that the only answer to this question must be some kind of international wardship for the Palestinian areas. Arafat must be removed, or at minimum his forces must be completely disarmed. Agreement on this is a precondition for any kind of peace agreement, not something we can hope will happen as a result of a peace agreement. Israel should encourage the Saudi proposal, and in precisely the terms that it has been encouraging them. If the Saudis genuinely have accepted Israel's right to exist, then they should have no problem making their proposals to Israel directly. Recognition does not mean peace; peace and diplomatic relations will follow the resolution of the conflict. But if Abdullah were to go to Jerusalem - or invite Sharon and/or Katsav to Riyadh - that would complete the parallel with Sadat in 1978. It will be objected that this is expecting too much of Saudi Arabia - that Abdullah has already made his gesture, and now it is Israel's turn. This is incorrect, because Israel's existence should not be a question at this date; what is a question is how to resolve the position of the Palestinians and what Israel's borders are. The starting point for dialogue, with every one of the states or entities that warred against Israel, was for them to recognize Israel. Once this is done, negotiations can begin, and in both Egypt's and Jordan's case, Israel's erstwhile enemies got pretty much everything they wanted from Israel as a result of these negotiations. The same precondition should exist for Saudi Arabia. But, to be fair, Israel needs to be prepared to offer something if Abdullah does go to Jerusalem. The one thing that cannot be offered is any notion that there is a Palestinian right to "return" to sovereign Israeli territory. And in this regard, note that all the commentators on the Saudi proposal have pointed out that it did not mention such a right. Israel also cannot accept a return to the '67 borders. That leaves really two possible concessions that Israel can make. One, Israel could agree in principle to giving different religions full sovereignty over their respective holy places - i.e., Muslim sovereignty over the Temple Mount (or at least the surface thereof). The main value of this concession is that it is a religious one rather than a national one. It is not, therefore, a concession to the Palestinians. Israel could just as easily cede control of the mosques to Jordan, or Saudi Arabia. (Whatever formula is ultimately becomes the basis for a resolution of the conflict will have to postpone certain religious questions to the Messianic future - after all, Israel cannot renounce Jewish claims to the Temple Mount, but only declare that the State of Israel will not press these claims, but leave them to the Messianic Age.) The only real downside is that it concedes in principle the division of Jerusalem. But even this it doesn't do to any significant degree, since Barak already agreed to this and, in any event, Israel does not want to absorb the entire non-citizen Palestinian population of Jerusalem. Two, Israel could agree in principle to the '67 borders as the starting point for negotiations, on the understanding that any adjustments to these borders would be compensated, either financially or with land elsewhere. This would be a major concession, in that Israel has never accepted the '67 cease-fire lines as diplomatically significant in any way. Moreover, once conceded, Israel could never retract such a concession. Most problematically, this would be a national concession to the Palestinians, who have done nothing to merit such a concession. On the other hand, this is another matter where, realistically, if there is to be a two-state solution, Israel will most likely wind up negotiating from the position of the '67 cease-fire lines eventually anyhow, and come up with some scheme for retaining military control of the Jordan Valley, sovereignty over the largest settlement blocs, etc. The big question still needs to be resolved: how can we have a two-state solution without compromising Israel's security given that the PA is a terrorist entity? And, if there is not to be a two-state solution in the near term, how and by whom is the Palestinian population to be governed? Abdullah's proposal does nothing to help answer the first half of the question; indeed, it changes the topic. For Israel to put the spotlight back on this key question, the government needs to be supportive of the proposal at least in principle, and see if it leads to anything, in spite of the diplomatic risks of doing so. As for the second half, if it does turn into something real, Abdullah's proposal may open a small door to the de-Islamicization of the conflict. If Arafat, say, does not follow Abdullah's lead, then Saudi Arabia becomes another potential partner for the Western powers in constructing an international administration of the territories to replace Arafat's regime. It should be recalled that, in the Camp David talks between Israel and Egypt that led to their peace treaty, Israel agreed to a framework for solving the Palestinian situation, and this framework was rejected by the Palestinians. It is not at all unlikely that, if Abdullah's overtures actually come to something, Arafat will do the same all over again, probably over the so-called "right to return." I do want to stress, I'm taking these proposals with a big heaping helping of salt. Saudi Arabia is a deeply corrupt regime significantly implicated in September 11th. I do not think that the larger war being waged against the West will be ended so long as the Saudi theocracy dominates the Islamic world. That said, the rest of the world is taking the proposal very seriously indeed, so I am, too. I never would have expected I would think nice things about President Musharraf of Pakistan either, after all. Monday, February 25, 2002
Anyone notice this news item? U.S. Expands Nuclear First-Strike Policy 22 February 2002 John Bolton, the U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, announced Feb. 21 that the United States is abandoning its longstanding pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. Since 1978 Washington has said it would break this policy only if such states attacked the United States in alliance with a nuclear aggressor. The rest of the article is at STRATFOR.com, which you can only access if you're a paying subscriber. But it doesn't say much more. I didn't notice this reported elsewhere. Did anyone else? I enjoyed this article from First Things on Tolkien and the genre of the serious fantasy novel. Obviously, this being First Things, we're getting a very Christian perspective on these books, which is not at all inappropriate. I've noticed the persistent "end of magic" theme in these books myself; it always seemed to me about the end of childhood ideas about good and evil and the beginning of adult moral responsibility. The connection with the renunciation of power is psychologically very interesting, but I obviously hadn't thought about it in a Christian sense. I don't think she says anything very interesting about Narnia, though, which really doesn't fit her model of how these books work. One thing I didn't know is that the Earthsea novels - which I loved as a kid - are based on a Taoist mythology. Anyhow, enjoy (I hope). From Arutz-Sheva: Fatah rejects Saudi "peace" plan; Israel is receptive. Here's my question: why has no one responded to Prince Abdullah as follows: "Sure, Israel will consider evacuating the Old City of Jerusalem to non-Jewish administration. As soon as Saudi Arabia evacuates Mecca to the same." In other political news, here's a link to a symposium from The New Republic on Campaign Finance Reform. What I think is notable about this is that, of the 4 editors chosen by TNR to air their views about the current round of campaign finance reform, none give it wholehearted support. All think it will be largely ineffective. Two think it is an outright bad idea, and a third thinks it will mostly have the effect of moving the Democrats to the right (which may or may not be bad, but is certainly not what The New York Times - the bill's strongest supporter - wants or expects to happen). Only one editor voices tepid support for the law, admitting that it is only a stopgap measure towards a system which would - my polemical view here - nearly wipe out private political activity in the United States. I supported Senator John McCain in the last election cycle. Interestingly, TNR supported him, too, a rare instance in which they made an endorsement in a GOP primary. Campaign Finance Reform was never a significant reason for my support of McCain - rather, I supported him mostly because he was a rare pre-9/11 politician who seemed interested in smoking evildoers. But, because I liked him, and because I was profoundly disgusted by the 1996 Clinton campaign's taking money from Red China, I was mildly supportive of McCain's signature cause. But since it began to appear that Campaign Finance Reform would become a reality, I have not heard a single coherent argument for the bill. the best argument I've heard is from Mickey Kaus, who said, in effect, that the bill should be supported because it will at minimum confuse the various players in political campaigns, and in that confusion new and interesting things could happen. This doesn't strike me as sufficient reason to do real damage to the First Amendment, as the issue ad ban does. Has anyone heard a good argument for this bill? Does anyone know where, say, AIPAC stands on it? RIORDAN FOR GOVERNOR. Okay, I don't usually do political endorsements, but here 'goes. Rick Riordan could be the best thing to happen to the California statehouse in a good long time. The GOP doesn't trust him because, well, he's not much of a party man. But I don't see why that should bother me. They also distrust him because he is basically liberal on the "social issues" - guns, abortion, gay rights, etc. I'm mushy-middle on most of these, but that's not the point; does anyone seriously think that a strongly pro-gun, anti-abortion, anti-gay-rights candidate is going to get elected to state-wide office in California? What I see in Riordan is a guy who brought LA together after a period of violent divisions that culminated in the 1992 riots, who nurtured the business community of a chronically underperforming urban area, and who his critics and supporters alike agree is his own man. But more important than all of these, he has taken a strong stand on what is probably the most important "social" issue in California today: ending bi-lingual education. Riordan - the liberal Republican - is the only GOP candidate red-blooded enough to call bi-lingual ed, "downright evil." And that's exactly what it is. Bi-lingual education - which typically has lower standards than English education, and is typically forced on students without their parents' consent - is the closest thing we have today to legal segregation in the schools, and is fully as pernicious as racial segregation was in the Jim Crow South. Further, I would argue that one primary purpose of having a public education system at all is to educate our racially and culturally diverse - and increasingly foreign-born - population in American civic culture, to bind the next generation of Americans to all previous generations to whom they frequently have no blood relation. That's certainly what the Progressives who championed public education early in the 20th century were after. Bi-lingual education is a knife in the chest of that vision, and has, along with other dubious educational initiatives of the last 30 years, fatally undermined popular support for public education. Post-September 11th, it is unconscionable that any public institution - particularly the schools - be promoting a political program that seeks to divide America culturally, as bi-lingual education does. There is a general consensus that bi-lingual education has been a disaster for children, and since Proposition 227 was passed California children who have moved from bi-lingual to immersion classes have shown remarkable gains. At this point, I suspect there are no reputable supporters of bi-lingual education in existence. The support comes mostly from activist groups, media moguls and politicians who depend on cultural division for their livelihood, teacher's unions who are defending the jobs of bi-lingual ed teachers (who are generally less-qualified than other teachers), and bureaucrats for whom support of the existing system is much cheaper and easier than the challenge of actually teaching immigrant children English. It's a bad policy without strong public support and with potentially strong public opposition. Nonetheless, and in spite of the overwhelming passage of Proposition 227, Governor Davis has recently moved to eviscerate the promising educational reforms that had been embarked upon, and no other GOP candidate has had the guts to tell the truth and call him on it. It has been enormously refreshing to have a President willing to call evildoers what they are, and put real muscle behind his talk. It will be as refreshing to have a governor in California who speaks the same truth to the corrupt power seeking to undermine the will of the voters and the education of that state's children. If he wins, who knows? Maybe we could even get rid of this pernicious system here in New York. Here's a link to Ron Unz's website's recent post about Riordan and bi-lingual ed. There's a lot more, obviously, about the fight against bi-lingual education on the site, and lots of info on the treacherous behavior of California's State Board of Education on this issue. I encourage all readers to spend some time at his site. Benny Morris: the new Gandhi (Ze'evi, that is) Check out the article linked above. I sent a piece by Benny Morris around in December. It is difficult to overstate the significance of his "conversion" to more right-wing views. It is also difficult to credit his conclusion - that Israel should unilaterally withdraw from the territories only to expect to have to reconquer them shortly thereafter. He has learned a lot, but he doesn't seem to have learned much from the Lebanon withdrawal. Rather, the choice for Israel is a simple one: they must destroy the Palestinian Authority themselves or find someone else who would prefer to do it for them. I personally favor the latter, if possible, because I, like Morris, do not love continued Jewish military rule over another people. The realistic precondition for such a scenario, however, is a massive and victories American intervention in the region - against Iraq, against Lebanon, maybe against Iran. The Sharon government has been extremely supportive of American efforts, and this is the main reason that he has not taken stronger action against Arafat to date. The extreme right understands this, and that is precisely why they are less and less supportive of the Sharon government - because they know that a stronger American presence means less Israeli freedom of action (as was the case after the Gulf War), and that the end game is some kind of international administration of the Palestinian population centers, not Israeli reconquest of the territories. Starting in media res, some thoughts on Purim. On Shabbat Zachor, we read a haftarah describing Saul's battle against the Amalekites. Saul is instructed by Samuel to utterly annihilate the Amalekites - men, women, children, even cattle and property are to be destroyed. The reason? During the wandering in the desert, Amalek attacked Israel from the rear - preying on the weak like a predatory animal. For this, Amalek is named an eternal enemy of Israel, and Israel is commanded never to forget to wipe out their memory. Saul vanquishes the Amalekites, but spares the best of their property as well as their king, Agag, as spoils of war. When confronted with this, Saul excuses himself by saying that he planned to offer this booty as a sacrifice to God. But Samuel is having none of it. He declares that God desires obedience rather than sacrifices, and that Saul has forfeited the kingship by his disobedience. We read this haftarah on the Shabbat before Purim because Haman (yimach shemo), the villain of the Megillah of Esther read at Purim, is the descendant of Agag, and the embodiment of the evil that opposes itself to Israel in every generation. This looks like a pretty simple story, if a bloodthirsty one. But there are complications. What is the sin that Saul committed, for which he loses the kingship? Is it for sparing the property and the life of Agag? No, say the rabbis; it is for mass murder. For the only possible justification Saul could have had for making genocidal warfare was a direct command from God. Once it could be established that Saul was not, in fact, obeying that command, then he was guilty of genocide. What is the significance of this argument? The things of God operate at a meta-rational level. God makes and unmakes whole worlds; it is certainly within His power, and His right, to destroy a nation or elevate it. But that kind of power is not vested with human beings. We must make decisions on a rational level. In the days of prophecy, some chosen individuals had direct access to that meta-rational level, but we do not. (To quote my wife's favorite rabbi Leonard Cohen, on modern would-be Abrahams: You who build these altars now to sacrifice these children, you must not do it anymore. A scheme is not a vision and you never have been tempted by a demon or a god.) Saul's sin was in thinking that God had raised him to a meta-rational level, able to go beyond good and evil and do what seemed right in his own eyes, regardless of God's command. And so he is punished not for what he failed to do - kill Agag and destroy his property - but for what he did: murder innocent women and children as part of a genocidal war. God's commands to us come in two forms: rational and non-rational. But even the non-rational commands (kashrut, for example) are for our own good. To the extent we are able, we should obey even if we do not understand, both for the simple reason that we are commanded and because in obeying we may come to understand. But this does not absolve us of the use of reason. For these non-rational commands are not anti-rational. We are not commanded to abandon our moral reason, because we do not have direct access to the divine voice and we must nonethless somehow come to understand God's commands. We must interpret scripture in a moral light, because we must interpret it, and there is no more godly light available to us. If we forget this, and think we are prophets, we will use the license of scripture to pursue our selfish interests by immoral means, as Saul did. And this could cause God to regret our election, as he did Saul's, with consequences too terrible to contemplate. Another lesson: Saul specifically spares Agag. Why? Perhaps because he is ransomable, and therefore valuable. Or perhaps because he is a king, and Saul, as a king, wants to reinforce the notion that kings are a special class of being who should not be killed. But it is precisely this special status that Samuel continually objects to, from the first murmurings of the people of their desire for a monarchy. God is the only true king; earthly kings are just leaders, instruments of the people and, like all people, instruments of God in history. Today, Israel faces an enemy who behaves as a son of Agag would - preying on the weak among his own people and in Israel, plotting destruction and perverting the legitimate grievances of his people. Should Israel continue to protect him from retaliation, because he is potentially valuable, or because he has the imprimatur of being a head of state, while his people and ours suffer from a war waged against the weak and defenseless? |