Gideon's Blog |
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Tuesday, December 31, 2002
Forgive me, but it seems to me that President Bush is making an ass of himself over North Korea. Situation A: A state that has been revealed to have a secret nuclear weapons effort, that we believe already has two nuclear weapons, that is still technically at war with a close ally, that has threatened nuclear war if we don't do what they want, that has just expelled international monitors and reopened a nuclear facility that our government said we would destroy unilaterally if it was reopened. Situation B: A state that we believe to have a secret nuclear weapons effort (but we haven't revealed hard evidence yet), that we do not believe has yet developed nuclear weapons, that is believed to have engaged in terrorist operations against the United States and its allies (but we haven't revealed hard evidence yet), that has just reinvited in international weapons inspectors and against whom we may be obliged (depending on your interpretation of the most recent Security Council resolution) to move against through the U.N. rather than unilaterally. We're rattling the sabre in against the state in Situation B and declaring that Situation A is resolvable by diplomacy and "economic pressure." This against a state with virtually no economic links with the outside world. I fear we're going to become a laughingstock. The Administration policy of downplaying the Korea threat is going to seriously undermine its case on Iraq. This is the scenario everyone was worried about when we abandoned the "two war" policy of the first Bush Administration and reduced force levels to the point where we expected only to "win-hold-win" (and that, it seems, is optimistic). This Administration is moving in the direction of being more appeasement-minded that the Clinton Administration, allowing North Korea to openly go nuclear with no consequence whatsoever. And it is revealing to the world that (a) America cannot handle two problems at once; (b) once you have nuclear weapons, America will be decisively deterred from attacking you. We are also suggesting, incorrectly, that our war in Iraq stems from ulterior motives. This can't go on. The United States military has got to start making visible preparations for fighting two wars at once. The North Koreans have got to start worrying that if they start up their plutonium reprocessing facility, we will blow it up. And we have got to start lining up the diplomatic ducks - not for a round of negotiations with North Korea, but for the reentry of weapons inspectors, peacefully if possible but by force if necessary. The Chinese need to get the message: we will not tolerate a nuclear North Korea. And we will not rely on the regime to "declare" itself non-nuclear. We will rely only on Western observers, on the ground, with full access to the country, to prove that there's no nuclear program going on. If the Chinese don't want a military confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea, they should have a confrontation of their own. This, it seems to me, is the minimum for us to be credible. It is the minimum for us to be able to launch the necessary war against Iraq with at least a fig-leaf of international support, and the minimum to keep North Korea from coming to the conclusion that it is home-free and blackmail will always work. In which case, triple the list of countries on the list to buy some of that North Korean nuclear technology. If we keep going down this road, I'm afraid John Derbyshire is going to be proved right on Iraq, and that Iran is going to go nuclear within months, with North Korean help. That'll leave us 0 for 3 against the Axis of Evil at the dawn of 2004. Happy New Year. This is probably a really stupid idea, but I'm going to engage The Corner in their ongoing debate about Max Boot's piece on neoconservatism: quid est? First of all, strictness in taxonomy is a mug's game. Something that should be in always gets left out and something wrong included in. We all have some idea of what a neo-conservative is when we see one, even if we can't define it perfectly. It's also silly to limit the label "neoconservative" to those individuals to whom it was first applied, for at least two reasons. First, what makes the phenomenon interesting is the extent to which it is an intellectual tradition, which means it must have descendants who may or may not be former leftists or liberals themselves, and may indeed have been "right from the beginning." Second, individual neoconservatives may change. They may abandon former beliefs and become something else: liberals, theocons, what have you. My own preferred method of characterization of intellectual streams is genealogically. So let's try that. Neoconservatives are Liberals. By that I mean neither that they are Lockean believers in the individual right to property nor that they are contemporary believers in coddling all sorts of sorry people. I mean something broader and deeper: that they understand themselves to be heirs to the Enlightenment, believers in Reason and Progress and that sort of thing. This distinguishes them fundamentally from Romantic and traditionalist conservatives. They may agree with Romantics or traditionalists on a particular point of policy, even on a broad outlook on a whole host of issues. But they will agree from different premises. The traditionalist will say that such and such is so because it has always been so, our ancestors always held it to be so, for generations we have held it to be so, and it is not for us to part ways with a so that has so lengthy a pedigree. A Romantic will say that such and such is so because it is the ineffable expression of the so-ness of something, and that this something would be utterly not itself were this not so; for someone who partakes of the something to hold that it is not so would be to be totally false to that something, a denial of its essential so-ness, and the greatest heresy. A neoconservative would say that such and such is so because it makes sense that it is so, most people have concluded it is so, there's empirical verification that it is so, those who argue it is not so are starry-eyed utopians or are just trying to arrogate power to themselves, and, even if we cannot conclude definitively that it is so at all times and everywhere, certainly there's no justification for holding it to be not so here and now. You can recognize this kind of reasoning most plainly in neoconservative stances on "values" issues and on crime. (One of the failures of Max Boot's article is to associate neoconservatism entirely with foreign affairs. The line about being mugged by reality was not only figurative but literal - the great crime wave from the 1960s through the 1980s mugged as many liberals into neoconservatism as did the persistence of Soviet aggression in the face of detente.) The whole "broken-windows" school of policing is a classic neoconservative policy initiative. Something that most people would characterize as common sense - let a block, neighborhood or city go to seed with petty crime and serious crime will also explode - is justified with empirical studies and detailed logical reasoning. Within the Liberal tradition, neoconservatives are Nationalists. This connects them, ironically enough, with the British Tory tradition and the American Whig (or National Republican) tradition. The old British Tories believed in a strong national government, while the Whigs believed in a more limited government and lower taxes. (The Tories believed in other things that your typical neoconservative might or might not believe, but we'll take that matter up later.) In the United States, the Jacksonian Democratic Republicans, while accused by their opponents of tyranny, were advocates of a weak (but geographically expansionist) central government, while the National Republicans (later the Whigs) favored a vigorous central government dedicated to internal economic development (Henry Clay's "American System.") Neoconservatives trace their roots back to this Nationalist tradition within Liberalism. That's why neoconservatives don't generally get terribly excited by the size of the welfare state or by the size of government generally. They favor a strong and vigorous central government. They are much more likely to object to the welfare state on values grounds than on the grounds of economics or first principals about the proper nature of government. They see nothing improper in the government taxing to improve the lot of the citizenry, or of the weakest element among the citizenry. And they are, frankly, not so interested in economics. They believe in economic growth, progress and dynamism; they have outsourced to others the proof that free-market economics is the best road to these ends. Neoconservatives are against tyranny, but they don't identify all government, however constituted or structured, as to some extent necessarily tyrannical. This fundamentally divides them from Lockean libertarians (who do think all government is necessarily somewhat tyrannical) and from traditionalists (who understand tyranny to be an abrogation of precedent by either the State or society, and who are therefore to some extent constitutionally opposed to the dynamism that both libertarians and neocons favor). Here's a genealogical way to encapsulate this thought: George Orwell was a Socialist because (among other things) he thought Socialism worked and capitalism didn't. He was wrong. But if Socialism did work, I suspect most neoconservatives would be Socialists. There are neoconservatives who take their nationalism even further. There is a Straussian tendency in neoconservatism, a tendency to elitism, to reifying the State in a Continental and very un-Anglo-Saxon manner, and to an Ancient rather than a Modern understanding of Liberty. That is to say: neoconservatives have a tendency to understand Liberty not as being left alone by the State but as the right (even the obligation) to participate in collective enterprise through the State. This isn't an absolute thing; neoconservatives are not Jacobins, and they approve of liberty in negative sense. But it isn't what stirs them in their marrow bones. This once again puts them very much at odds with libertarian-style conservatives and with traditionalists. What saves them from being Germans altogether is that they are not Romantics - they ground their views in Liberal premises. They may not always have the greatest appreciation of negative liberty, but their understanding of individual welfare is a Liberal one, not a Romantic one. Good thing, too, or they'd be very dangerous. Some people, of course, think they are very dangerous anyhow, on the grounds of their foreign policy ideas. I think Max Boot overreaches a bit in his identification of neoconservatives with "hard Wilsonianism." His underlying assumption that neocons have a Whiggish view of history is correct - Progress and all that - and, since they believe in a vigorous and dynamic State, they would see nothing wrong with "helping history along" as it were. But there is an enormous difference between progressive and utopian internationalisms. It is the difference between Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. TR did not try to set up a system for governing the world, whether hard (based on raw Anglo-American power) or soft (based on treaties and supra-national bodies) or a combination of the two (which is arguably what Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman inaugurated in the 1940s). He sought to use American power in American interests, and he had an enlightened view of what those interests consisted of and an optimistic view of the possibility of improving the world through the exercise of power. That sounds like the basic neocon view to me. Neocons are distinguished from Wilsonians - even hard Wilsonians - because they do not want to run the world and because they do not feel obliged to right all of the world's wrongs. That is why the editorial board of The New Republic is fundamentally not neoconservative, even though they get along very well with neoconservatives with whom they share fundamental objectives. Neocons and Wilsonians alike value democracy and freedom, alike believe that the spread of democracy is in American interests, alike believe that the internal character of a regime affects its foreign policy (this is a key insight that realists reject), and alike believe that more likely than not democracy and freedom are universal goods that will appeal to the whole planet. But Wilsonians also believe that there is a moral obligation to "make the world safe for democracy;" that America should not get its hands dirty by trucking with dictatorships; and that America is obliged to take the lead in ordering the world according to a rational and humane fashion. "Soft" Wilsonians would achieve these things by international law and negotiation, and "hard" Wilsonians by force. But neocons properly reject all of these particulars. They believe, rather, that it is a good thing, not a moral obligation, to promote democracy; that America sometimes has to deal with dictators for the sake of larger interests, even particularly odious ones; and that the world is not supposed to be "ordered" according to some grand design, but rather than America should, as a matter of Enlightened self-interest, stand on the side of the forces of light where possible. If neocons are animated by a concern for American interests above all - if understood in an Enlightened manner - then how are they distinguished from the so-called realists? Primarily by their Whiggish optimism. Realists have a pronounced tendency to declinism, to the belief that power inevitably dissipates - at least in a relative sense - and exercise of power dissipates it more quickly. Further, they tend to believe that existing arrangements are the most stable, and changing them more likely to injure American interests than to advance them. This is an old, Tory view of the world, one that arguably was born in the crucible of the Indian Mutinee, which ushered in the British Imperial policy of indirect rule through existing native elites (and the creation of these elites where they arguably did not exist). Neocon optimism leads them to be far more eager to exercise national power than are the realists. How, then, are neocons distinguished from paleocon views on foreign policy? Max Boot's disparagement notwithstanding, the so-called paleocon foreign policy tradition has a long pedigree in this country, not limited to the pre-WWII America Firsters. I think the proper term for this tradition - again, in keeping with my own preference for the genealogical - is Jacksonian, from President Andrew Jackson. Jackson had a very dim view of the central government at home, dismantling America's central bank and opposing tarriffs (which National Republicans favored as a way to develop industry). But he did not have a similarly dim view of the central government abroad. Rather, he favored the use of national power to expand the United States. His Democrat predecessors had made deals with France and war on England to take Louisiana and to attempt to take Canada, and defined Latin America as an exclusive American sphere of influence; his successors made war on Mexico and would happily have added Cuba and other territories had the Whigs (worried about the expansion of the Slave Power) not frustrated their designs. A modern update of this philosophy would be to favor the use of national power to promote American interests defined narrowly rather than in an Enlightened manner. The Jacksonian tradition is deeply pessimistic about the ability to improve the world, but much more optimistic about America's ability to gain power through the use of power, which is what distinguishes them from the realists. I will admit that there is a strain in neoconservative thinking that corresponds to the crusading caricature of the paleocons. These folks - and I'm not sure whether or not Max Boot is among them - are indeed advocates of a kind of hard Wilsonianism, advocates of what amounts to an American Empire. I think this is an extraordinarily foolish ambition, and I don't think more than a handful of writers ascribe to this notion. Certainly the prominent neocons in the Bush Administration - such as Paul Wolfowitz - do not ascribe to it. But there are a few writers out there who have this notion. The proximate basis for their views is the American victory in the Cold War and America's consequent position is overwhelmingly dominant power on the global stage. Given that neocons generally have no problem with the exercise of national power, at home or abroad, it is understandable that some would fall under the utopian temptation, the belief that our power is so great that it has practically no limits. As I said, this is a very dangerous and false idea, but I don't think it is one with general currency among neocons. Apart from the proximate cause, the deeper cause of such a crusading neoconservative strain is a particular interpretation of America's two crusading wars: the Civil War and World War II. These were the only wars that America fought to a conclusion of unconditional surrender, and the notion of unconditional surrender seems to have taken hold in the crusaders' minds and become a model for how wars of righteousness are to be fought. The crusaders' understanding of the Civil War is not really wrong, but it is important to recall that this was a war for the definition of America, not a war to conquer the world. I do think that makes all the difference. As for World War II, I think their interpretation is fundamentally flawed, a misreading backwards from the conclusion of that war and the advent of the Cold War. We did not insist on unconditional surrender because we wanted a free hand to reshape Europe in our image; we demanded unconditional surrender because we wanted to break the back of German nationalism once and for all. It was the nature of our enemy that dictated our strategy, not the nature of our own ambitions. We did not fight World War II to save the Germans from Hitler. And we most certainly did not fight World War II to save the Jews from Hitler. This would seem to be an opportune time to bring up the question that Max Boot addresses without confronting: why are there so many Jews among the neoconservatives? This is not an inadmissable question. Unless one has a preexisting animus towards Jews, it in no way undermines the legitimacy of neoconservative thinking to point out that there are many Jews among its leading thinkers, any more than it undermines the legitimacy of anti-Communism to note that exile communities from Poland, the Ukraine and so forth were among its strongest adherents. It is nonetheless of legitimate sociological interest to ask: why so many Jews, particularly in comparison with other streams of conservative thinking? The deep reason, I think, is that outside of the ultra-Orthodox communities, Jews overwhelmingly identify as broadly Liberal, and neoconservatism is part of the Liberal tradition. The Enlightenment is rightly seen as having been of enormous benefit to the Jewish people, and so - again, outside of ultra-Orthodoxy - there isn't any strong anti-Liberal strain in Jewish political thinking. Jewish conservatives in Israel might be Romantic, or traditionalist, or theo-con - though, among those of Western origin, most are Liberal there, too - but none of these are very plausible positions for a diaspora community. With respect to foreign policy, on a very practical level, Jewish interests are bound up with the fate of the State of Israel. Realists are unlikely to take risks to defend an ally like Israel (though Nixon, a consummate realist, did). Traditionalists and libertarians are unlikely to favor an active foreign policy of any kind, and Jacksonian paleos are unlikely to want allies in the first place. Among rational foreign-policy outlooks (I leave out the pacifist and anti-American outlooks which are shockingly popular among American Jews considering where Jewish interests actually lie) that leaves Wilsonianism (hard or soft) and neoconservatism as the most compatible with objective Jewish interests. Less practically, I think, the Jewish romance with the State of Israel has changed many Jews' understanding of national power. The creation of Israel, its stunningly unlikely success, and specifically the importance of the exercise of military power to its success, have made many admiring Jews more favorably inclined toward the exercise of national and military power. Those affected by this change, meanwhile, joined a more longstanding Jewish tradition in the West of strong national feeling towards their country of origin - Jews served with enthusiasm and distinction in World War I on both the French and the German side (and, I believe, in disproportionate numbers to their share of the population) and on both sides in the American Civil War. And then there's Disraeli, the paradigm of the type, a man who, though a baptized Christian, still considered himself a Jew, and was a most ardent aggrandizer of British national power and glory. The strong nationalism of French, German, British and American Jews was grounded in their self-understanding as citizens, equal with their Christian neighbors. In any event, this feeling persists as much as national feeling does generally (that is to say, stronger in America than in Britain or France, stronger in Britain or France than in Germany), and it is obvious how it would lend itself to a neoconservative outlook. Returning to World War II: the problematic aspect of crusading neoconservatism stems from the misinterpretation of World War II, and this misinterpretation is, I think, a Jewish misinterpretation. The Holocaust was, of course, one of the two or three worst catastrophes to befall the Jewish people in their entire history, comparable to the destructions of the First and Second Temples. It was also, of course, a modern crime of monstrous proportions, the epitome of evil in the 20th century. It is understandable that Jews would interpret World War II almost entirely by the light of the fires of Auschwitz. But this is a spiritual interpretation that would be primarily persuasive to Nazis and Jews, much less so to the world at large. Hitler may indeed have started his war in order to murder the Jews of Europe. That may even have been his primary objective. But that is not why he was fought by Britain or America, and it is not why the Allies demanded unconditional surrender. The extraordinary evil of the Nazi regime was secondary; what was primary was its extraordinary threat. By misreading World War II as a crusading war against a regime of diabolical evil, some neoconservatives have created a template for the exercise of American power that is profoundly unrealistic. They have developed a notion that America - with friends if possible but unilaterally if necessary - must destroy great evil wherever it lives, a remake societies by force where they are in the thrall of evil. This is a template for an American imperium that could never be - and will never be - put into practice. And while I suspect it is something of a fringe phenomenon, writers who have made rhetorical gestures in the direction of an American Imperium - and Bill Kristol is prominent among them - may yet discredit the entire enterprise of neoconservative foreign policy through overreaching. In any event, they are certainly providing useful fodder to opponents of neoconservative thinking who seek to reduce it to caricature. Monday, December 30, 2002
It's been a surprisingly busy day today, so blogging has been light (so far). But the system is crashing, so I thought I'd comment on the latest troubles in the Democratic House leadership. It seems Nancy Pelosi doesn't understand black folks. Worse than Lott she is. And funny thing: the CBC has a point. Here's the money quote, from a leadership staffer: "[I]f the Black Caucus is complaining about Pelosi not picking a person of color, and that seems to be their only complaint, they're being just as closed-minded as they claim Pelosi is. I mean, Matsui is a person of color." Earth to Democratic Leadership: the only people who think this way are rich liberals and college kids. The vaunted "Rainbow Coalition" exists entirely in their minds. Americans of Japanese descent and American blacks have, to a first approximation, no interests and no culture in common (except in as much as they are all Americans, a characteristic they share with Republican-leaning groups and therefore not particularly germane to this kind of analysis). If you doubt this, run a little test. Who do you send out to rouse black voters in a close Louisiana Senate race - a black House Democrat, or a Japanese House Democrat? Bill Clinton, our first Black President, could square the circle of putting together the money elite and the popular base of the Democratic Party. Dick Gephardt never quite connected with the money crowd, but at least he had a feel for the voters. Pelosi is a pure creature of the money elite. She actually thinks black voters - and politicians - think like they teach they do at Berkeley. All around the country, in the most durably Democratic areas, Democratic hegemony is coming apart because of the disenchantment of black voters and their alienation from the party elite. That's what sank the Dems in the last NYC mayoral race. That was the primary dynamic driving the last LA mayoral race. And Al Sharpton is revving up for a Presidential run in 2004. It's going to be ugly, folks. Friday, December 27, 2002
I finally got around to reading Mayor Bloomberg's Vision for Lower Manhattan. Guess what: it's really, really good. The plan is anchored in a few, key truths: * Downtown is now a 24-hour neighborhood, not a business district, but it lacks crucial amenities to make it a real family neighborhood. * As a business district, downtown suffers crucially from poor transportation links to the airports and to the suburbs. * New York City as a whole and downtown in particular make extraordinarily poor use of its waterfront, which in most cities is a magnet for tourism and recreation. The plan, therefore, is oriented around solving each of these problems. Public investments to create new parks, a tree-lined promenade on West Street, and facilities on the waterfronts will make the area far more attractive to residents. Less-expensive investments in amenities like schools and libraries would logically follow the private-sector creation of new housing in developments similar in concept to Battery Park City. New transportation links to Newark Airport and Kennedy Airport (by train), the LIRR and by ferry to Laguardia Airport and the New Jersey suburbs would dramatically improve access to downtown as a business destination. (It's a shame that there's no link planned to MetroNorth; that would seem to be too expensive.) These transportation upgrades chew up 80% of the budget for the plan. The emphasis is on building neighborhoods and creating a city friendly to pedestrians, commuters, tourists and residents. It's a sensible plan that would significantly upgrade the quality of life downtown. And it would have positive spillover effects. A more viable downtown Manhattan would also mean a more viable downtown Brooklyn, and would make the New Jersey suburbs most convenient to downtown more attractive as well. Investing in a plan like this is the best way to ensure that New York recovers more quickly from the current slump. Of course, there are other investments needed as well. The far West Side of Midtown - the 30s through 50s west of 8th Avenue - is a region crying out for a new business district. They are talking about extending the #7 train starting next year, providing a key transportation link; that would probably be the biggest bang-for-the-buck transportation improvement the city could make. Other plans for the area will probably wait until we see if we win the Olympics bid, since that area is where most of the Olympic facilities would be located. The Long Island City area of Queens is another area that should be developed. And I'm going to throw in my own pet area for development: Red Hook. With regular ferry service to downtown and midtown, Red Hook could be radically transformed in a few years into a premier outer-borough residential area. The views are spectacular from there and the only reason the area is has remained a slum (albeit a "funky" one, with artists and the like moving in) is the lack of transportation links to Manhattan; there are no subway lines in the neighborhood. The city needs badly to invest in the future. Bloomberg clearly sees this. One the things Giuliani did very poorly was planning. He got many things right - including the most important thing: fighting crime - but this is one thing he got wrong. Bloomberg is headed in very much the right direction. But none of this is going to happen unless his Administration also gets the city's operating budget under control. The city is just not fiscally credible enough to invest the way it needs to. That means making tough decisions, and challenging entrenched interests, to reduce city spending. We have got to be more effecient about bus service, about social services, and about the big kahuna: education. If we don't spend less on running the city, the interest costs from these kinds of crucial investments will be unsustainable. On this matter - reducing spending - Bloomberg's record is far more equivocal, even negative. Bloomberg was elected to do three things. First, hold the line on crime. So far, pretty much so good, though it's early innings yet. Second, reform education. So far, not so good; much of what has happened has been symbolic, and we're all waiting to see whether Bloomie has the guts to challenge entrenched interests or whether he's just going to tinker. He's won control of the schools; now he has to use it. Third, rebuild the city. Here he gets a mixed grade. His ideas about development are mostly excellent. But his ability to achieve them depend on his handling of the budget and taxes, which has been fair to poor. Give him credit where credit is due: if he achieves half of what he's planned development-wise, Bloomberg will go down in history as the Baron Hausmann of 21st century New York. Now let's see if he's got the guts to do what's necessary to pay for it. So, what with all the horrible news around the world, let's talk about something completely irrelevant: Supreme Court Vacancies. Okay, it's not completely irrelevant. But both conservatives and liberals have a vastly over-inflated sense of the importance of the Supreme Court. Liberals think the Court picked the last election. Now, I think Bush v. Gore was a poor decision. I think the equal-protection rationale for the decision is very problematic, inconsistent with conservative principles, and, in any event, completely inconsistent with the remedy ordered. An Article II violation, meanwhile, was emotionally persuasive - the Florida Court decision was ridiculous, in no way reflected the law, and seemed designed to prejudice the outcome - would have entailed a massive innovation in doctrine. We'd need a whole new area of law to come up with tests to determine when a decision is "interpretation" and when it is inadmissable "law-making" - and this sort of thing is not what one associates with conservative jurisprudence. But all that aside, the Court did not change the overwhelmingly likely outcome in the 2000 elections. Had the Court refused to hear Bush v. Gore, the best-case outcome for the Gore camp would have been to have two slates emerge from Florida: one certified by the Secretary of State and reaffirmed by the Florida Legislature and the other certified by the Florida Supreme Court. In which case, Congress would have settled the matter. And Congress was at the time (and still is) controlled by the Republicans. What are the odds that they would have voted to make Gore President? Essentially nil. The Court's intervention weakened its own credibility in a bid to increase its power. It did not change political history. Conservatives and liberals alike think that the Supreme Court, with the right appointees, would vote to overturn Roe v. Wade. They are both wrong. The Court is not going to overturn Roe v. Wade. A Court willing to take that dramatic step would never be confirmed by the Senate. The Court is very sensitive to its own credibility. It values that credibility more than the rightness of any one decision. Therefore, even if by stealth a Court were confirmed that intended to overturn Roe, it would not do so until there was a clear social consensus in favor of such action. I do, by the way, expect Roe to be overturned some day. But not 5-4. Plessy v. Ferguson was effectively overturned by Brown v. Board of Ed. The latter decision was 9-0. Dred Scott was overturned by the Civil War, not by the Court. Lochner v. New York was not decisively laid to rest until FDR threatened to pack the Court; the Court had supported its own precedent against the social consensus until such a position became unsustainable. That's how it will be with Roe: when there is a general social consensus that the decision was wrong and must be changed, it will be changed. Not before. The Court is not completely irrelevant, of course. It can change things at the margins. It can, like any branch of government, increase or decrease the people's confidence in its abilities, can arrogate more power to itself or dissipate it, and so forth. So it's interesting to speculate on how President Bush is going to shape the Court. The most likely retirees are Rhenquist and O'Connor. O'Connor will only stay if she gets to be Chief Justice. Stevens will retire only when his health begins to fail. Scalia will retire if he gets bored or fed up. Ginsberg might do the same, or if her health became an issue. Thomas, Kennedy, Breyer and Souter will be on the Court for many years to come. Rhenquist is the leading advocate of the "New Federalism," which, in fact, amounts to arrogating to the Court the responsibility for delineating the proper boundaries of state sovereignty (since there is no apparent hard-and-fast rule for such delineation). Liberals object that this amounts to the Court vetoing acts of Congress that it doesn't like when it can justify the veto on the grounds of state sovereignty, and letting such decisions slide when they don't object. In any event, without Rhenquist this particular judicial philosophy will drop a notch in prestige. The other two leading conservatives on the Court - Scalia and Thomas - have different bugaboos, and the liberals on the Court are actively hostile. O'Connor is identified primarily with muddle. She is the least predictable and least comprehensible Justice on the Court. If she is elevated to Chief Justice, we can look forward to several years of total confusion. I hope President Bush doesn't make this mistake. If he doesn't, she's likely to retire. With Rhenquist and O'Connor out, the state of Arizona will entirely lack representation on the Supreme Court. Why this does not prompt the Administration to immediately redress the under-representation of Arizona on the Court is beyond me (after all, Arizona has been trending into the toss-up column). But they seem more intent on elevating a Hispanic or female candidate. I actually think Gonzales would be a perfectly fine choice for the Court. I don't think he's a Souter or a Scalia. He's not going to push a particular judicial philosophy strongly and I don't think he's a liberal manquee. He'll be a consensus man, and therefore a fit replacement for O'Connor. And I suspect he'll reason more coherently than she does. Of the various Appeals Court nominees Bush has given us, I'm most pleased with Michael McConnell, possibly because he's one of the few of them that I know something about. In any event, what I know pleases me, and I hope there's ultimately a spot for him at the top. But I doubt it; he hasn't earned his political chops yet. What I think is in some ways a more interesting question than "whom will Bush appoint to the Court" is "whom will he appoint Chief Justice." If he appoints someone from outside, it will have to be someone confirmable. That means someone without a strong judicial philosophy, frankly, because an obvious ideologue won't be confirmed, and frankly, Bush does not need a high-profile Supreme Court fight unless he is highly confident of victory. So for conservatives, I think an outside candidate means a weaker candidate. Unless, of course, the inside candidate is awful. The most-often mentioned potential choices for a candidate from on the Court are: O'Connor, Kennedy and Scalia. O'Connor would, as stated above, be a disaster. Kennedy - who shows the most obvious signs of coveting the job - would be almost as bad. His decisions, unlike O'Connor's, appear to be reasoned. But the reasoning varies widely from case to case such that, in the end, my conclusion is that he's a sophist: he knows what a legal argument looks like, and constructs one to suit the conclusion he wants to come to in a particular case, regardless of whether it is consistent with precedent or his own past decisions. He's a mess. Scalia would certainly make conservatives happy. But he would be a lousy choice, for two reasons. First, there would be a fight. Yes, Bush would likely win because, as a sitting Supreme Court Justice, it's hard to argue that Scalia would not be qualified for the job. But Scalia prides himself on being a gadfly, on picking fights for the sake of illustrating a principle, which means he has a potent record of statements - in decisions and in other writing - that will be used against him in confirmation hearings. Bush will have to give ground elsewhere - probably on his choice for a new member of the Court - in order to win a fight to make Scalia Chief. And then, once he was confirmed, Scalia would be a lousy Chief for the same reasons that he would be a hard-to-confirm nominee. He's a provocateur, not a consensus builder. He revels in his dissents. He would be understood by everyone to be on the rightmost edge of the Court. If Bush nominated a Gonzales to fill the empty slot left by a Rhenquist retirement, and made Scalia Chief, Scalia would be Chief in name only because the center of the Court would form around Gonzales as the most articulate Justice most likely to bring Kennedy and O'Connor along with him. I'm going to go out on a limb and say that the best inside candidate for Chief Justice is Clarence Thomas. The old claim of inexperience is no longer valid; next year he will have served on the Supreme Court for 12 years. He would be harder for liberals to fight this time than last time, for three reasons. First, he's already on the Court. Second, after Clinton the whole Anita Hill thing could not be repeated with a straight face. Third, and most importantly, there is an enormous difference between being appointed the the Court and being appointed Chief Justice. Back when Thomas was being appointed to the Court, he was derided as a Scalia tool. That's much less plausible if he's Chief Justice. How do you call someone an Uncle Tom when they're running the joint? Who, precisely, can pull the strings of a man who has risen to the absolute top of his profession and holds his position for life? I also think Thomas' views are the most compatible with President Bush's views, more so than Scalia's or Rhenquist's. Rhenquist, as I said, is most identified with the "New Federalism." Scalia, meanwhile, is most identified as a species of Formalist - or, perhaps better, a hybrid of Formalist and Traditionalist. Thomas, by contrast, is best identified as a devotee of "Natural Law." Scalia, as a Formalist, would argue that non-ennumerated rights do not exist. Thomas, by contrast, has argued that rights really do exist out there in nature, and are not merely a creation of law, and that, for example, the Declaration of Independence is a good guide to what those rights are. Our natural rights are prior to the Constitution and, in some sense, overrule it. Of course, Thomas is a judicial conservative, which is to say he's against creating rights by judicial fiat; but his reasoning, in a nutshell, is that the basic right is the right of the people to self-government, which is violated by having the Court act as a ruling priesthood. Scalia and Thomas vote alike most of the time. But where they differ, the differences are interesting, and in general Thomas differs when his understanding of Natural Law, which springs from the Declaration of Independence, conflicts with a pure judicial formalism. I think that President Bush would be more likely to vote as Thomas does than as Scalia when they do differ. I also think that Thomas' views are more likely to move the consensus on the Court going forward than are Scalia's; I think Scalia has made all the converts he is going to make, and for the rest of his term his opponents will devote themselves to arguing that he is, in fact, not a Formalist but a partisan - an argument that is easier to sustain in the wake of Bush v. Gore. So there: you have my votes. I expect Gonzales to be appointed upon Rhenquist's departure, so I'm not bothering to vote for or against, only to predict that he won't be another Souter. I vote for Thomas to replace Rhenquist as Chief Justice. I vote for McConnell to be elevated to the Court as soon as possible, preferably to replace O'Connor. An yet more good news: N. Korea to Expel U.N. Inspectors. Expelling the UN is, of course, necessary if one wants to produce electricity from a nuclear plant. At least it looks like this is bringing the rest of the world around to the conclusion that the regime is run by homicidal maniacs. Which, in turn, means implementing the Iraq model will be that much quicker and easier in North Korea. I can't decide whether to hope this news is true or bogus: Scientist Claims to Produce Human Clone. On the one hand, it would be very good for people to realize this is upon us. Then we might get some legislative action on the question. On the other hand, this is upon us. I want to stress, as I have in the past, that the primary reason to ban human cloning for reproductive purposes does not require any novel ethical concepts. The procedure is plainly far too dangerous to the infant. The incidence of birth defects in cloned animals is very high; as an example, many of them age prematurely, a terrible fate to doom a child to. We can disagree about whether, in theory, safe reproductive cloning would be a good thing or a bad thing, and whether cloning for research purposes is categorically wrong, perfectly OK, or somewhere in between. We can nonetheless agree that reproductive cloning should be illegal now for a very simple reason: it is a danger to the life and health of the human being brought to life in this manner. It is one thing to nurture and love a human being who suffers from genetic abnormalities. It is another to coutenance a form of medical intervention known to cause such abnormalities. Tuesday, December 24, 2002
Remember the old Tom Lehrer song? First we got the bomb, and that was good, 'Cause we love peace and motherhood. Russia got the bomb, but that's okay, 'Cause the balance of power's maintained that way. Who's next? France got the bomb, but don't you grieve; They're on our side (I believe). China got the bomb, but have no fears; They can't wipe us out for at least five years. Who's next? Egypt's gonna get one, too, Just to use on you-know-who. So Israel is getting tense; Wants one in self-defense; The Lord's our shepherd says the psalm, But just in case, we're gonna get a bomb. Luxembourg was next to go, And who knows, maybe Monaco; We'll try to stay serene and calm When Alabama gets the bomb. Cute. Nice we could joke about it once, back when we were really only scared of the Russkies. The current nuclear club stands as follows: USA Russia China Britain France Israel (undeclared, but not fooling anybody) India Pakistan North Korea Here are a couple of other countries that might have the bomb or could have it very soon: * South Africa (they say they ended their program. You sure they ain't lying?) * Iraq (we believe they are still a couple of years away. Last time we thought that, they were within six months of completion of their first device.) * Iran (they've been working on this since the days of the Shah. They'll have it soon, if they don't already.) * Ukraine (they supposedly returned all nuclear warheads to Russia. You sure they did?) * Kazakhstan (ditto) * Lybia (feeling left out of the Axis of Evil, they're working furiously to catch up and re-establish their bonifides) * Japan, Germany, South Korea (it's not like it would be hard for any of these guys to go nuclear, if they felt insecure or anything) * Democratic Republic of Congo (that's right, the basket case in the middle of Africa, a country without a functioning central government and occupied by the armies of various neighboring states has a nuclear plant; who knows what they've been doing with the material from it?) There's probably a bunch of other countries I've left out. The cat is out of the bag. He's running around the room clawing the drapes and peeing on the carpet. He's gotten into the trash and the houseplants. And he's keenly aware of all the other out-of-the-bag cats, particularly the lady cats in heat, and has been making frequent trips around the neighborhood to meet with all of said lady cats to increase the out-of-bag cat population. So what are we planning to do about news like this? Here's what I'm worried about. We're about to go to war with Iraq, a country we believe is just shy of developing the bomb. Let's assume this invasion goes splendidly, Saddam's air defenses are annihilated in the first 6 hours, his missile batteries are wiped out on the ground and the handful that are fired are shot out of the sky, his army is routed in the field and his chief bonbon maker slips him a cherry-liquer mickey and cuts off his head as a goodwill gesture to the advancing allied armies. One down. Half a dozen to go. Have we made the larger task any easier? Have we really made progress? Well, if the Iranian army decides this would be a good time to take back their country from the mullahs, then my answer would be yes. But if not, it seems to me the answer might be no. After all, what kind of signal have we sent to the proliferators of the world? North Korea violates an agreement, builds nuclear weapons, and threaten us with nuclear war if we don't meet their demands. So far, we haven't met those demands. But we haven't come up with any other bright ideas for dealing with them either. Pakistan builds nuclear weapons, provides safe harbor for anti-American terrorists, and the United States relies on them as a key ally in the war on terror - and pressures their nuclear-armed neighbor, India, not to wage defensive war against them - because we can't afford to let their nukes fall into the hands of the real bad guys. It seems to me, the message to Iran, etc. is: work faster. Once you have the bomb, you will be able to dictate terms to the United States. Your regime will be secure. You'll periodically have to make gestures that enable the U.S. to save face, but basically there's nothing we can do to threaten you. War on Iraq will be useful in a few ways. It will eliminate one regime that has declared the U.S. to be an enemy and seeks our harm and will soon be able to do that harm on a catastrophic scale. It will increase our maneuverability vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia. It will demonstrate American resolve to the region generally. If we are able to build a stable, reasonably free Iraq, that's a big bonus, an example that other Arab states might look to as a model rather than the current favored model of anti-American thugocracy. But unless we do something decisive about North Korea, Pakistan and Iran, I think part of the message that the Iraq campaign will deliver will be: the U.S. only wants easy kills. We can't let that message take hold. The stakes are too high. I'm not sure what we do about North Korea. I don't think an Osirak strategy - a surgical preemptive strike to take out the nukes - will be effective, and it has to be 100% effective or the consequences are too dire. Which means we have to follow the Iraq model: build an international consensus that the country must disarm and let in inspectors to prove there has been disarmament, or face invasion. If North Korea threatens to nuke Seoul or Tokyo if invaded, explain that the entire population of North Korea will be incinerated if that happens - and wouldn't it be much nicer for the Dear Leader to spend his retirement in a villa in Tahiti or Monaco rather than being incinerated along with all his loving subjects? But that might not work either, and again, the consequences of failure are dire. Iran is, in some ways, tougher and in some ways easier. There's a chance that the country "tips" politically, in which case the whole worry about proliferation becomes much less serious. We could probably bribe a friendly, democratizing state to end its nuclear program. But it's tougher for a bunch of reasons, a key one being that all our other wars in the area - against Iraq, against Afghanistan - have increased Iranian power. We can't go to war with Iran without a firm foothold in these neighbors. And an Osirak strategy is not likely to work in Iran either; some of their nuclear facilities are very well-hardened. But the toughest is Pakistan. We are pretty sure that Pakistan helped the North Koreans build their bomb. We have been treating them so gingerly precisely because we're afraid if they get pissed off they'll just toss a nuke al Qaeda's way. Then we really have problems. They are nominally an ally, so we can't really threaten them at all, much less attack them. What's our leverage? How do we respond credibly if we think they are playing a double-game - helping Lybia, say, to get the bomb? The acid test right now, though, is North Korea. Iran doesn't have the bomb yet, and Pakistan is nominally our friend. North Korea has the bomb, and is our declared enemy. If we don't do anything about that - if we let them slide like we did for the last 10 years - our deterrence is shot, no matter what we do in Iraq. Monday, December 23, 2002
Israeli ultra-hawks are increasingly panicked about Bush's road-map (and Sharon's support for same) for a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And Israeli doves are increasingly gleeful about the prospect of Sharon's impending humiliation at the hands of the Quartet. But we all know that Sharon will be bailed out by his old friend Yasser who will never agree to anything, ever, anytime. Nice to know there are some constants in this world of change. You know you're taking your blog too seriously when you wake up at 3 in the morning with ideas for an item. But you're probably still okay if you can get back to sleep within 5 minutes. The item: 3rd party nightmares. Most folks are assuming that President Bush is going to be re-elected without too much trouble in 2004. We're even expecting him to add to his majorities in the House and Senate. He will, by then, have presumably won a war in Iraq, the economy will be somewhat on the mend, he'll have a handful of minor but soudbite-friendly domestic accomplishments to point to (leave no child behind and all that) and maybe even something significant (Medicare reform, anyone?) on the domestic front to point to. Plus he'll be the beneficiary of a broad trend towards greater patriotism and concerns about foreign policy that generally benefit Republicans. None of this is foregone. We should win in Iraq, but we'll still be there in 2004, and "winning" by then won't be looking so pleasant. The economy might not be on the mend; I swing back and forth between bull and bear myself. Those legislative accomplishments might turn out to be thin on the ground. But what could really take the wind out of W.'s sails, I think, is a credible challenge from the nationalist right. Suppose a credible figure - not necessarily a politician; could be a Perot-type self-made businessman with a sharp speaking style and, preferably, a military background - came forward and said: we are not taking the war on terrorism seriously. We are getting caught in a classic trap of a dominant power, worrying about placating allies and maneuvering among rivals while letting our enemies get away. We're tying down our military in Iraq and Afghanistan because we were too humanitarian to use our full firepower, and scare potential enemies off ever attacking us again. We do not have the head of Osama bin Laden to hang outside the White House door, and so our enemies have no respect for us. We are unwilling to offend domestic minorities or Arab allies, and so we are vulnerable to further terrorist attack. His platform would be simple, and consist of five planks: (1) Secure the borders. There are people in this country with no right to be here, and some of them are a danger to the security of the country. Deport 'em all. At a minimum, deport all the ones from countries or with ethnic backgrounds that give us reason to worry. Rescind the student and other visas of people who come from suspect countries - including supposed allies like Saudi Arabia. Deploy the National Guard along our southern border and, if the Canadians won't play along, our northern border as well, to keep out undesireables. Damn the economic consequences; the economic consequences of a successful nuclear or biological attack on America would dwarf any possible cost to an enforcement of immigration laws and the encumbrance of trade. (2) Raise the body count. Make it plain to our enemies that we don't care how many civilians are killed; if killers come from their country, they are going to get fried. Saudis not being forthcoming? Seize the oilfields, seize their overseas assets, and take Mecca hostage - any more terrorism against America or Americans and we nuke the place. The Arab world resents us because of their weakness? Show them just how weak they are, how completely impotent they are to protect themselves from our wrath. The message has to be clear: you want a war, you'll get a war, and we don't care if your civilization never recovers from the damage we do. Deliver that message and we'll finally get some results. (3) Reinstitute the draft. We're in a world war but we don't have enough men to win. We let OBL get away because we didn't have the men on the ground to take Tora Bora ourselves. We're being played for suckers by a Korean nutjob with Don King's hair because we don't have the forces to take on two nutjob dictators at once. Well, why not? What are we waiting for? All those English grad students protesting America: give 'em a rifle and ship 'em out to the Straits of Malucca. That'll teach 'em something useful. (4) End politically-correct pussyfooting. Look, there are people out there who want to kill us. Might as well know who they are and let our kids know. Islam is not a religion of peace. Stop pretending it is. Stop telling our children this isn't a war with Islam; it is, and they started it. You want to teach kids that America brought September 11th on ourselves? Go teach in Paris, or Beijing, or Riyadh. This country was founded by Christians, and has a Christian culture, and while we are tolerant of other faiths and treat everyone equally, we do not need to apologize for our civilization to anyone and we do not need to change because y'all are offended. If you don't like the products of our civilization, don't buy 'em. If you don't like it here, leave. (5) Take care of Americans first. Our trade policy, our foreign policy, our immigration policy - all our policies - should be designed to take care of Americans first. Our allies and our trading partners need us more than we need them. If the Koreans don't want us, we should go home and leave them to the mercy of their Northern brothers. Ditto our "allies" in the Gulf. For that matter, ditto the Europeans, Egyptians, Israelis, Canadians - everybody who relies on American protection or aid to survive and then has the gall to set conditions for us or make further demands on us. There's only one superpower around. Get used to it. And get in line. Now, there's stuff in that platform that is counterproductive, stupid or just wrong. My point was not to outline my dream candidate's platform by any means. My point was: a plain-spoken, tough-talking, angry but credible candidate like the above could take a bite out of Bush's hide. He would hammer away at the Bush family connection to the Saudis, the fact that OBL is still at large, the fact that the FBI and CIA haven't been revamped, the fact that illegal immigration is still massive. He would put the Bush Administration on the defensive in a way that a Democrat could not. How well do you think such a candidate could do? 2% of the vote? 5% of the vote? How about if the economy was in a double-dip recession, and this candidate had an economically nationalist platform as well? How well do you think he'd do if there were another, major successful attack on America, with thousands of casualties? Of course, the Democrats have a third-party nightmare of their own. 2004 is going to present them with the same problems as 2002: the Democrats will have to somehow answer the Bush fiscal policy and the Bush foreign policy in a way that is credible to their base and credible to the country as a whole. In 2002, that meant attacking the Bush tax cut but not calling for its repeal and criticizing the plans for war in Iraq while voting for that war. Turned out to be a pretty poor strategy. So what will they do in 2004? Whether they reprise the same strategy or turn right or left, the Democrats cannot credibly run in 2004 full-on against the war on terror. This country was attacked, and most of the country understands we won't become safe by running away and hiding our heads in the sand. The country wants a successful war and a successful homeland security strategy. The can run from it or embrace it or even try to one-up Bush on it, but they can't run against it without embracing a loss of McGovernite proportions. And that leaves an opening for the McGovernite left. What do the Democrats do if a third-party candidate runs on the following four-plank platform? (1) End the war. Yes, we were attacked by al Qaeda, and yes, that terrorism was indefensible. But we have removed the government of Afghanistan, and now we are occupying Iraq, and the war shows no sign of ending. Bush says the war will continue for a generation. The Democrats don't really argue with him about that, but are debating around the edges - how much attention we should pay to this target vs. that, how much we should defer to this ally vs. that. We are reviving the Cold War National Security State in a new and more dangerous form, and this will not end terrorism but will increase it, as every country we attack seethes with anger and resentment at us. The only solution is to end the war. We should continue to pursue specific targets of criminal investigation, under the auspices of international bodies such as the International Criminal Court. But we should immediately end the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, pull our troops home from Asia, stop undermining governments in the region and committing assassinations and other war crimes, and get out of places where we don't belong and are not wanted. The Democrats are afraid to say it, but we're not: war is not the answer; only justice is the answer. (2) End fossil-fuel dependency. Whoever runs on the Democrat ticket will embrace some kinds of restrictions on fossil fuels. But nothing really serious. Nothing like raising gas taxes to European levels, or initiating a massive carbon tax, or committing to California-style restrictions on auto-emissions. Democrats, after all, do have to win some votes in the middle of the country. But third-party candidates don't. The argument is clear: the reason we were attacked on September 11th is that we are involved in a heavy-handed way in the politics of the Middle East. And the reason we are in the Middle East is our dependence on fossil fuels. If we care about saving American lives - and the environment, of course - the first thing we must do is dramatically reduce fossil-fuels use, and damn the economic consequences. (3) End the alliance with Israel. Look, it's a simple fact that American support for Israel is not appreciated in the Arab and Muslim world. Israel is an ethnic nationalist, exclusivist state that is oppressing an Arab people by denying them equal citizenship in Israel or a viable state of their own alongside Israel. America should not be party to supporting such a country. Jews have suffered a great deal in history, but so have many other peoples, including the Palestinians. America should, at a minimum, end all aid to Israel until unconditional peace negotiations are resumed. We'll end terrorism a lot quicker by ending injustice than by dropping bombs. (4) End economic racism at home. I have no idea what that means, but it is definitely part of the platform. The Democrats are afraid to reverse the Bush tax cut terrorism. They are afraid to challenge the corporate conspiracy state that gave us Enron and Worldcom and so forth. The Democrats are dependent on corporate money just like the Republicans; the only thing that changes is which corporations, and in some cases not even that. Etc. etc. - you know the drill. This is pretty much the usual laundry list of lefty posturing. It isn't particularly popular in the country. But it is very popular on the fringes, and it will be more popular against a 2004 Democrat who refuses to attack Bush frontally on the war. And even if the war is bogged down and ineffective, the Democrats are not going to run on a platform of surrender; they are going to run on a platform of more competant foreign policy. That means the dogmatic anti-war types will be tempted to vote for their own candidate. In 2000, the Nader vote almost tipped Wisconsin, Minnesota, Washington and Oregon to the GOP. A vigorous McGovernite campaign in 2004 should push all these states over the edge into Bush territory. Martin Kramer has revamped his website. It's a lot more readable now. One interesting tidbit I just read there: about Norman Pattiz' efforts behind Radio Sawa and plans for a companion T.V. station to beam American values to the Arab world. He's surprisingly convincing. And the pitch leaves me wondering: why do we need the U.S. government involved, necessarily? I'm not saying it would be cheap, but this would seem to be a no-brainer project for, say George Soros. I mean, this is what the Open Society is all about, isn't it? After doing so much to prepare the ground for the liberation of Eastern Europe, does Soros really want to be remembered for all time as the biggest donor in the history of NORML? Isn't there a lot of world left to liberate? I haven't blogged about it in a while, but does anyone doubt that Iran has the potential to be the next Turkey - a pro-Western, pro-American, majority-Muslim secular democracy? Check out the latest from The Student Movement Coordination Committee for Democracy in Iran: Leave Palestine Alone, Think About Us! (scroll to the bottom). Iran is building to one of two ends: Moscow in 1991 or Beijing in 1989. If Iranian patriots make a serious bid to seize power and drive out the mullahs, all will depend on what the army and the security forces do. If, as in Russia in 1991, they ultimately unwilling to suppress the people by force, then any attempted coup will fail and the people will prevail. If, as in China in 1989, they are bribed or persuaded to side with the regime, then there will be a dreadful slaughter of the Iranian people, but the regime will survive. The latter outcome would be terrible for the people of Iran, and terrible for American interests. All America's and her allies' moves in the region - the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, the war to end Palestinian terrorism, the struggle to contain nuclear proliferation and to manage Pakistan, the development of the Caspian oil region, the effort to bolster Turkey's position as a Western Muslim nation - Iran is the key to everything. A friendly Iran makes everything possible and a hostile Iran makes everything more difficult, because all of our moves make Iran more powerful and more central. In that regard, I continue to maintain that one small (well, not so small) thing we could do to advance the collapse of the Iranian regime would be to wipe out Hizballah. Hizballah is the most dangerous, anti-American and anti-Western terrorist group in the world after al-Qaeda, and it cooperates closely with al-Qaeda. No group is in a better position to disrupt our war plans, whether by starting a war with Israel or by taking direct action against Western targets. And Hizballah is a creature of the Iranian regime, their primary means of power projection well beyond their borders. Attack Hizballah, and the Iranian regime will have to either take the hit quietly, which would be devastating to the regime's prestige and credibility, or respond with direct attacks on America or our overseas assets. The latter, obviously suicidal course could, if the mullahs tried to implement it, push the Iranian armed forces to take the plunge and side with the people against the regime. We do not want to go to war with Iran directly. We want a revolution there. One has been building now for at least five years. We need to do everything we can to secure its victory. Saturday, December 21, 2002
John Derbyshire has his own comments on the Fred Reed piece I blogged about last week. It's a good column; check it out. Friday, December 20, 2002
Seriously folks, while I am pleased Senator Lott has resigned, he has damaged the Republican Party, and the Republican Party needs to undo the damage. That means showing by deeds that the Dixiecrat mentality has no hold on the modern GOP. Here's my preliminary list of 5 things to do and 5 things not to do: DOS: * Have Secretary Snow meet with Bono. That whole O'Neill trip to Africa was a good idea, not a bad one. Africa is going to have 2 billion people in 50 years, it's a major oil-producing region, it's a prime battleground in the war with the Islamo-fascists, and it's a region suffering from 14th-century level misery: the AIDS epidemic, genocidal warfare, massive deforestation, kleptocratic government, slavery, and on and on. And yet there are germs of hope - points of light, you might say - all over the continent. A pro-trade, pro-debt-relief, pro-democracy, anti-slavery, anti-Islamofascist policy on Africa fits right into Bush's broader agenda. All it takes is some attention, and willingness to stand up to interests - like agriculture and textile industries - that stand in the way. Heck, don't send Snow - send Bill Frist. He already knows the territory well. * Develop an agenda for prison reform. Back in 2000, a nasty attack ad accused Bush of effectively killing James Byrd all over again by refusing to sign a hate-crime law in Texas. The charge was loopy, but in a more direct sense Bush - and his Democrat predecessor - contributed to Byrd's death, because his murderers were the products of the Texas penal system. There's a real risk that when the bad guys locked up in the '90s get out, we'll have a massive new crime wave, and there's very little the government is doing to reduce recidivism from our prisons. Maybe there's not much we can do. But why not invite Chuck Colson to the White House for a summit on the topic to see if he has any ideas. * Promote a serious school-reform agenda. Bush got rolled by Ted Kennedy in 2001. Don't let the fight end there. Ending bi-lingual education, promoting charter schools, promoting school choice, raising standards for teachers and students - there's a huge reform agenda that has basically been abandoned, and while we all suffer for it black Americans suffer the most. Get this back on the front burner of domestic policy. If domestic policy has a front burner anymore. * Continue the important outreach to black ministers. Look, no matter what he does, Bush isn't going to get a huge black vote in 2004. That's not the point. It's not good for America to have the parties deeply divided on racial lines. It's going to take a long time to build up sufficient trust for black voters to consider voting Republican in any significant numbers. Changing principles is not what's needed. But outreach and communication is. It's a generational effort. And it should be undertaken not because it'll bring a big electoral advantage - it won't, certainly not short-term - but because it's the right thing to do for the country. Hey: remember all those news stories about Bush potentially joining a black Methodist church in Washington? Wouldn't now be a good time to actually do it? Not saying he couldn't still church-hop, but being a dues-paying member at a black church, and praying there semi-regularly, would send a pretty clear signal, wouldn't it? * Win the war. In the end, there's a reason this Administration has kind of abandoned domestic policy. Nothing else matters if we lose the war. So win it. DONTS: * Give in on affirmative action. Americans have been and remain strongly opposed to race-based affirmative action. They are far more supportive of class-based affirmative action that is race-blind. This should not be a difficult change in law to pull off or to defend in front of black audiences. If the ultimate result of the Lott farce is that Republicans abandon the principle that race should be a continually declining and ultimately null factor in law, that would be a real tragedy. * Treat the NAACP as a moral arbiter. No one needs to apologize to them and no one needs to get their blessing. One of the many reasons Lott had to be removed was that with him around the GOP would have had no standing to articulate an alternative position to the NAACP on how to achieve racial harmony. They would have been racial hostages. Well, he's gone. The GOP passed the test; maybe not with an A+, but they passed. So don't get defensive. * Make Colin Powell untouchable. If he's running an independent foreign policy, as it sometimes appears, he should be canned, and I don't care how popular he is. If he's got the full support of the President and they're playing some kind of good cop/bad cop routine, as it also sometimes appears, he should be retained, and I don't care how upset conservatives get. But his race should have nothing to do with it. He's not a token. He's not in his current position because he's black. He's in his current position because he is a powerful representative of America abroad, one who inspires confidence and in whom foreign leaders happily place their trust. That's exactly what you want in a Secretary of State, so long as he still has the confidence of the President. * Go on a witch-hunt for closet segregationists - in either party. Nothing has been less edifying than hearing Republicans complain about Clinton's praise of the late Senator Fulbright or Senator Byrd's notorious Klan history and recent references to "white niggers." And even less will be gained by going after these kinds of figures now. Same goes for the GOP ranks. Lott was the head of the Republican leadership and he regretted the demise of segregation publicly, and failed to understand what was so terrible about what he said after he said it. There is no basis to tar by association everyone who voted with Lott, who was friends with Lott, who accepted Lott's apology, who was sponsored by Lott for one job or another - you get the idea. The point has been made. Hopefully everyone in the GOP - and the Democrats - got the point. If they didn't, and a comparably egregious circumstance arises in the future, that will be the time for an outcry. Not now. * Run Al Sharpton-related ads in 2004. Let him destroy the Democratic Party on his own. You can't possibly help by making him an issue. Just let him do his thing and sit back and watch. And let the bloggers make the mock. Okay! With Lott out of the way, we can get our backs behind increasing the GOP majority in the Senate. Prepare your target lists: Senator Patty Murray, Mom in tennis shoes and a burka Senator Fritz Hollings, Senator from Mickey Mouse Senator Chris Dodd, the Che Guevara of New England Senator Barbra Streisand - I mean Barbara Boxer. Yeah, I'm feeling pleased. Looks increasingly likely Lott will go down. He's losing people like Pete Domenici, an "old bull" who might have been expected to support Lott on the grounds of Senatorial fellowship and who has a lot to lose now if Lott survives. By my count, Lott appears to have locked up 10 votes (plus himself) and Frist the same, with two more votes highly likely. Here's the list: LOTT VOTES Campbell (CO) Cochran (MS) Hatch (UT) Lugar (IN) McConnell (KY) Murkowski (AK) Santorum (PA) Specter (PA) Stevens (AK) Voinovich (OH) There are probably other solid Lott votes I'm not counting. Here's the Frist rundown: FRIST VOTES Alexander (TN) Allen (VA) Bond (MO) Chafee (RI) Domenici (NM) Enzi (WY) Inhofe (OK) McCain (AZ) - hates Lott, so very likely, though he hasn't said anything yet that I'm aware of Nickles (OK) Talent (MO) Thomas (WY) - hasn't said anything, but rumored to be a Frist vote Warner (VA) If I were Frist, these would be my top targets to convert to my side: Senators close to the President (Bush wants Lott out); Senators whom Frist helped elect this year (they owe him); Senators vulnerable to a strong black voter turnout next time (voting for Lott will piss them off); Senators identified as strongly Christian (they're probably the most offended by what Lott said); and Senators identified as more liberal (they probably hate Lott the most). So here's my list of targets: Allard (CO) Brownback (KS) Chambliss (GA) Coleman (MN) Collins (ME) Cornyn (TX) Dole (NC) Graham (SC) Grassley (IO) Hutchinson (TX) Kyl (AZ) Roberts (KS) Snow (ME) Sununu (NH) That gives him a couple-vote margin for victory. Thursday, December 19, 2002
Peter Beinart thinks the right-wingers who have called for Lott's resignation still don't get it. So how does he explain letters like this? Beinart's interesting personal history (he was raised in Africa) makes him a particularly credible liberal writer on race. And he has legitimately high standards on the topic. And yeah, the National Review editorial was not the strongest of the many statements against Lott on their website. But hey: they've been running a half-dozen anti-Lott stories a day since a couple of days after the scandal broke. They've published forceful principled attacks from the likes of David Frum and Robert George and less principled, more pragmatic attacks from the likes of Jonah Goldberg and their editorial. I have a hard time seeing how they've been soft on Lott or how they've avoided the principled stance that segregation was an unmitigated and unconscionable evil. At the end of his piece, Beinart accuses conservatives of believing that all right-wingers are basically nice folks and all liberals are basically perfidious. I do know people who think this way - though I know plenty more who think the opposite. (Of course, most of my friends and family are basically liberals, not conservatives, so I'm not working from an unbiased sample.) But his evidence is that National Review mocks the NAACP and the NAACP despised Lott. Why does Beinart think that the NAACP is the arbiter of who is a racist and who isn't? Does he think that National Review is the arbiter of who has liberal bias and who doesn't? Does he think that CAIR is the arbiter of who is anti-Arab or anti-Muslim and who isn't? I don't think so. Even if you thought that NAACP was the official "voice" of black America, you would be wrong to think that they were the arbiters of right and wrong with regard to the Lott affair. Lott said that the country would have been better off had the Presidency been won by a one-issue segregationist candidate. That can only mean that he thinks the effort to end segregation was wrong. That is a morally wrong viewpoint. It is unacceptable not because it offends some people but because it is an affirmation of evil. It is not an easy thing to come from a conquered people, but it can have positive consequences on character. General MacArthur famously empathized with the Japanese under his rule because he was a Southerner, and knew what it meant to be a proud culture utterly defeated. Those in the South who have most fully reckoned with the evil legacy of white supremacy - and there are both Democrats and Republicans, including plenty of conservative Republicans, in their ranks - are the most credible white spokesmen on the subject of race in America. Lott is not one of them. He is so much not one of them that he has, still, no idea of the serious wrong in what he said - I agree with the first half of Beinart's editorial without reservation. But the record should show that some of the angriest responses to Lott's statement came from the political right - from people like Bill Kristol and David Frum who believe in Republican Party principles, believe that Dixiecrat principles are their diametric opposite in every way, and will not stand for having the two confused by having a Dixiecrat nostalgist as the leader of the Republican Senate. We'll put Turkey in NAFTA, bring in Britain, Poland, Czechia and Israel for good measure, then we buy Greenland for good measure. Come on out with your hands up, Eurocrats - we've got you surrounded! Jim Bennett (link via Instapundit) thinks we should take Ankara up on its threat to Brussels and extend an invitation to Turkey to join NAFTA. An excellent idea. I've been arguing for some time: we don't want the Eurozone to grow on the notion that it will thereby be diluted and less of a threat. We want it compact and manageable so that it can still function as an ally (if it remains one) and so that more solid allies (like Britain and Turkey) are not restrained from supporting America by their membership in the EU. I think extending an invitation to, say, the Czech Republic to join NAFTA would change the politics of EU expansion suddenly and dramatically. Here's a simple illustration: the Czechs ask why they can't join both NAFTA and the EU, and have favorable trade terms with both regions. We say, why not? The EU says: unacceptable; once you join the EU, Brussels decides what trade terms you have with the outside world. How likely do you think the proud peoples of Eastern Europe will be to sign up for EU membership when the threat to their hard-won sovereignty by so joining is made so starkly manifest? We should not be pressuring Brussels to let Turkey into the EU. We should simply do the following: tell our Turkish allies they are welcome into NAFTA, and tell Brussels that we will not allow NATO troops (i.e. Turkish ones) to be placed under non-NATO command (i.e. the EU "rapid reaction" force) without the contributing country's express permission (unlikely to be forthcoming after being so snubbed by the Eurocrats). Let Brussels try to build its super-state without our - or the Turks' - help. Well, we've lost another election to anti-Americanism: South Korea picks liberal Roh for president. The positive side to this is that Roh is going to be more serious about reforming the chaebol (though less serious about reforming the labor unions) than Lee would have been. But the election was primarily about relations with the North, and the Koreans appear to have narrowly voted to plant their heads firmly in the sand and hope the Dear Leader has no nasty plans for them. It's the German election all over again. The most pessimistic view now would be: the alliance with South Korea is going to end. If South Koreans believe that the North is not their mortal enemy, they will not tolerate American troops on their soil. South Korea could be rapidly Finlandized, kicking out the Americans, indulging in anti-Japanese nationalism and relying on China and on payments of wergeld to keep the North's most aggressive impulses in check. Even if South Korea doesn't move affirmatively in this direction, it could be pushed there by the North. If North Korea becomes a declared nuclear power and continues to take actions directly hostile to American interests, while reassuring the South of its benevolent and brotherly feelings towards them, the U.S. will be in a real bind. We cannot take action against the North without cooperation from the South unless we are willing to completely sunder our relationship with South Korea. How, for example, could we threaten war against Pyongyang if they threaten to retaliate against Seoul and Seoul is not in our corner? And as President Bush argued almost a year ago, North Korea is truly part of the axis of evil, the essential supplier of missile and nuclear technology to a host of dangerous regimes that are our primary targets in the current war. The Korean Penninsula is a huge problem. We need to bring the leadership of the reformist, liberal parties around to supporting the American alliance. We need to convince them that the North is a clear and present danger, and they need to tell their people that the Americans are in Korea to protect them, not to rule them. This is what we have a State Department for. Is anybody home? I'm beginning to really worry that this Administration can't juggle all the international problems it has to deal with at once. Another excellent Diary from David Frum on the Lott implosion. I'm so happy he's got this new perch. I enjoyed his book on the 1970s, but I'm enjoying even more this daily dose of his moral and practical intelligence. Wednesday, December 18, 2002
Well, the LMDC has unveiled the new plans for the WTC. I blogged a detailed response to the last round of plans here. What do I think of the new round? They're horrible. I tried to give these guys the benefit of the doubt last time. I'm not going to give it to them this time. Supposedly, people were upset that the first round of designs wasn't bold enough. Which is fair; the buildings were short, dumpy and crowded together. The three good ideas to emerge from the planning were: recreate as much of the street grid as possible; build a promenade over West Street culminating in a park on part of the site; and build a major transit hub including subways, PATH train, and ideally LIRR and Metro North trains. No good ideas for actual buildings emerged. So what have our architectural innovators delivered for the second round? You wanted bold? We'll give you arrogant. You wanted big? We'll give you monstrous. These are unquestionably some of the ugliest building designs I've ever seen. They would permanently disfigure the lower-Manhattan skyline. They are terrifying, out of scale sculptural notions that no one could love or feel at home in. They are designed to crush humanity beneath their awesome weight. They are everything bad about the WTC and nothing of the good - all the grossness and inhumanity, none of the elegance and simplicity. And the memorials are soul-destroying and meaningless. They are the opposite of what we need. I'm somewhat at a loss to say which design is the worst. Meier's Borg-like grid? United Architects' mass of towers collapsing into one another? SOM's rendition of the world's largest Blue Man Group pipe organ? It's a tough call. Only professional architects of world-class caliber could come up with designs so patently awful. THINK delivers three designs, none of them remotely good, but none of them quite so horrifying that one wants to have them banned from ever competing in such a forum again for fear of the damage they would do if they were ever allowed to build something. All three designs are banal colossi, either office towers or erector-set atriums. If these fellows went to work on simpler, smaller projects, some day they might be ready to tackle a big and important project like this one. Foster & Partners delivers a similarly banal and similarly awful scheme of twinned collapsing towers (the designers seem to think they are kissing) and gaping holes in the ground as a "memorial" - to what, I have no idea. I have never seen a more depressing grave. Then there's Daniel Libeskind's Studio, whose plans are, I admit, completely incomprehensible to me, a jumble of jagged edges and asymmetric walls of glass. And then, the one exception to the horror. Peterson/Littenberg's design at least involves buildings that look like buildings. They've got bottoms and tops, they taper, they've got a bit of detailing - they are classically designed skyscrapers. They've incorporated the West Street promenade idea from the best of the first-round designs for the area. The layout of the buildings and of the parkland is mostly intelligent and humanist. I would quibble with having the park where the promenade terminates cut off from the central square by a row of buildings, but that is, as I say, a quibble. The biggest disappointment is that the buildings lack any overarching stylistic theme such as unites Rockerfeller Center into a coherent whole. If they executed this design, it would enhance the city and not damage it irreparably the way the other designs would. But there would be an opportunity lost. Allow me, then, to remind everyone of Fred Turner's intelligent design for a new twin towers, one that would harmonize with the surrounding buildings and with the Brooklyn Bridge in a really elegant way. I've proposed my own emendations to his original concept, but I want to urge him to get in touch with the folks at Peterson and Littenberg, obviously the only firm in the competition to care about the city more than about who can lay the biggest turd on its prime real estate. Perhaps he could push them a bit in his direction. I fear for the future of my city, people. I really do. Tuesday, December 17, 2002
Okay, I'm bored and running a simulation that will take a while. Let's play the most boring game in politics: handicapping the 7 dwarves. We last saw these critters in 1988. Then, they were Babbitt, Biden, Dukakis, Gephardt, Gore, Hart and Simon. (Oh, Jesse Jackson ran that year, too - same in second - but I don't think we're allowed to refer to him as a vertically-challenged individual.) Dukakis, the hobbittiest of the bunch, took the palm that year. This year, with Gore out of the running, the dwarves number at least seven yet again: Daschle, Dean, Edwards, Gephardt, Kerry, Lieberman, Sharpton are considered most-likely to run, with potential appearances by '88 alums Biden and Hart (!) as well. How do they rate? And who is playing whom? Daschle is playing Gephardt. The Dems are different now than they were then; there's less room for a Gephardt '88 run of forthright economic nationalism and middle-of-the-road stances on social issues. But Gephardt ran as the boring party leader type that he was and Daschle will be running as that this time. If he runs. Which I think he won't, 'cause he'll poll terribly. I don't know anything about Howard Dean, and I don't need to. Dean is playing Babbitt (who in turn was playing Udall): the nice nobody whom everyone basically likes and thinks is a decent person but who doesn't have a prayer of winning. Edwards is playing Gore. There's a notion current in The New Republic and other bastions of Gore-worship that Gore ran in 1988 as Scoop Jackson: a firm anti-Communist believer in a moral foreign policy and a traditional New Deal Democrat message on domestic issues. He didn't. He ran as a Southern moderate. He was pro-tobacco and tried to finesse the whole batch of "social issues" that loom ever larger in Democratic ranks: abortion, guns, death penalty, etc. His history in foreign policy matters was to develop tactical responses to the GOP that seemed reasonably "pro-defense." His record was similar on social and economic issues. Edwards will be playing the same game this year: young, fresh face, and culturally credible for a general election because he's from the South, but with no really unique message of his own to deliver other than his moderation. I continue to predict, however, that Edwards will not run, or that if he does he will quit early, before Super Tuesday. It's too expensive a game to play for fun, and he knows he's a long-shot to win, if only because he's got nothing to run on yet. Also, he's going to have to work hard to defend his Senate seat in '04; if he loses that, he's out of the game altogether. He's gonna wait until '08. Gephardt is not playing any of the Democrats who ran in 1988. He is playing Bob Dole circa 1988, and predict he'll do as well: win in Iowa, lose in New Hampshire, then fade to black after Super-Tuesday. His conversion to muscular foreign policy on Iraq will not win him any primary votes, and even if it could I don't think he'd be terribly convincing as a spokesman for a hawkish foreign policy. He'll do decently because of his union support, but it won't be enough. Kerry is, in many ways, playing Dukakis. He's a "card-carrying" liberal from Massachusetts who compares himself to John Kennedy and has a nutty wife. He will likely run a strong campaign and become increasingly credible as rivals fall away. But he bears some similarities to other Democratic candidates of the past. He resembles Hart in his messianic self-regard and his personal recklessness (in Kerry's case, this is expressed in dare-deviltry rather than in womanizing). He resembles Gore in his lack of human touch. But he's not running on new ideas and he won't be running as a moderate trimmer. (Then again, this race won't be about new ideas; the Democrats aren't convinced at all that they need new ideas.) So mostly I think he's Dukakis. I maintain that Kerry's the front-runner: he's got the money, he's got the message, he's got a semi native-son thing in New Hampshire and a strong organization in South Carolina, and there is no credible Clinton/Carter moderate in the race who can take the nomination away from him. If his personality doesn't cause him to self-destruct, he's my bet to be the nominee. If he doesn't, I retroactively change my view that he's playing an amalgam of Dukakis and Hart; instead, he's playing Biden. Biden's the one Dukakis was most worried about early in the campaign. Then his weird personality caused the campaign to self-destruct. It could just as easily have been Dukakis' weird personality to cause his campaign to self-destruct, in which case it's entirely possible that Biden would be a footnote to history instead. The New Republic desperately wants Joe Lieberman to run for President because he's the only Democrat to full-throatedly support war in Iraq, and the staff of TNR is still voting for the late Scoop Jackson. But if Lieberman runs, he'll be running as Paul Simon: another decent fellow whom everyone likes and everyone thinks would make a great veep, if not quite a President, but whom not enough people will vote for. Lieberman is, of course, well to the right of where Simon was in 1988. But he won't run that way, because he's going to want to win. He is not going to lead a revolt in Democratic ranks, and if he did he would lose and lose badly. But running as a mainstream Democrat, Lieberman will be less convincing than if he ran an issue-oriented campaign designed to shake up the party rather than win. Lieberman is not trusted by unions, or minority pressure groups, or the feminist lobby. He could pander to these folks to get them onboard if he was likely to win, but he's going to be a long-shot from the start so why would they go for him instead of someone with a record they like better? The enviros like him, of course, but they like Kerry just as well. The insurance and pharmaceutical companies who bankroll his Senate campaigns will be exposed as a liability in the primary, and again, there are other candidates who are sufficiently business-friendly that they'll be able to raise money: Kerry in particular will have little trouble in this area. If Lieberman really throws himself into the contest, he could do as well as Paul Tsongas did in 1992, and expose the fact that a significant minority of Democrats are worried enough about Iraq to want the party to have a more muscular stance, just as Tsongas exposed the fact that a significant minority of Democrats worried enough about the deficit to want some restraint on spending. But it's a minority. Lieberman is Simon: nice, clean, well-regarded, and doomed to lose this race. That's the list. Right? Oh yeah, Sharpton will be playing Jackson. I wouldn't call the first time tragedy, but the second time will definitely be farce. The only question is: how much damage will he do to the Dems? Donna Brazile is now encouraging black officeholders from Southern states to run as "favored sons" in every Southern primary, to encourage black voters to vote for them rather than for Sharpton. The practical impact of this, of course, is that black voters will have no influence at all on the choice of nominee. Interesting that Brazile, a black woman who worked for Gore and Dukakis, would advocate such a strategy. One of these days, the angry black vote is going to make the national Democrats as hopelessly ungovernable an organization as the New York Democrats. Sharpton is the man to make it happen. Can he do it this year? I vote no - but I'd be foolish to bet on it. So that's my prediction of the race, based on the current players. Gephardt wins Iowa, Kerry wins New Hampshire, Lieberman, Edwards (if he runs) and Sharpton hang on through South Carolina and maybe through Super-Tuesday. If Kerry wins South Carolina by putting together a coalition of Democrat vets and black voters, he puts it away early. If not, and Lieberman or Edwards wins it, we've got more of a horse-race, but I still think Kerry pulls it out in the end. If Sharpton wins any primaries, the party will begin to |